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Abstract
We study whether corporate income taxation affects the long-term growth of newly
incorporated companies through its effect on their choice of leverage at entry. We
first document the distribution of initial leverage, which is persistent over several
years. We then find that a decrease in corporate income taxation leads to a sizeable
decrease in leverage at entry. This effect on initial conditions has long-term effects:
an inverted-U relationship exists between leverage at entry and long-term corporate
growth, conditional on survival. These effects are economically sizeable, and stronger
in countries with better creditor rights and more transparent financial transactions.
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1 Introduction
Modern economies grow largely by achieving higher productivity through a process of
creative destruction that continuously creates entrepreneurial opportunities (Aghion and
Howitt, 1992) and allows successful newcomers to feed innovations to incumbents (Akcigit
and Kerr, 2018) or to challenge, and potentially displace, them (Acemoglu et al., 2018).
Entrepreneurial companies rely on external finance to fund the development of their
innovations, because the cost of these investments typically exceeds the wealth of the
founders. Both debt and equity are used for funding entrepreneurial innovation (Robb
and Robinson, 2014), and access to external funding is beneficial for entrepreneurial ex-
perimentation, whether through debt (see, among others, Black and Strahan, 2002, Chava
et al., 2013, Cornaggia et al., 2015) or through equity (see, among others, Kerr and Nanda,
2015, and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013).
Debt and equity have different effects on firm growth also through their incentive and
contractual characteristics. Theory holds that the use of ’convertible’ securities, which
have a strong equity component, is the optimal contract for funding entrepreneurial com-
panies, because it provides investors with incentives to actively engage in building the
company, entitle them to stronger control rights, and induces more efficient refinancing
decisions (see Da Rin, Hellmann, and Puri (2013)).
Theory also points to the beneficial role of debt for screening and monitoring borrowers
(Diamond, 1984). For founders, debt also has two important advantages over equity.
First, it allows them to avoid the ownership dilution that comes with equity. Second, the
deductibility of interest paid on debt for corporate income tax reduces the effective cost
of financing through debt (Graham, 2000). Entrepreneurial companies often take several
years to become profitable, but most countries allow the exploitation of tax deductibility
through carry-forward allowances that are long enough to matter for the initial choice of
indebtedness. A downside of debt, however, is that it exposes the company to financial
distress and bankruptcy risk, which is particularly high for young companies whose sales
can be volatile.
We therefore expect the choice of leverage to be relevant for the future growth of
entrepreneurial companies. An analysis of how corporate income taxation affects the long-
term growth of young firms through its effect on leverage at entry is however still missing.
This is the main goal of our paper, which contributes to the literature on the importance
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of initial conditions for corporate performance. We specify our research question into three
objectives.
First, we document the distribution of initial leverage (i.e., leverage at entry) and its
evolution over the following nine years for a large sample of European newly incorporated
companies. We still know very little about the capital structure of young, unlisted, entre-
preneurial companies, (see, however, Robb and Robinson, 2014 and Dinlersoz et al. 2018,
for two notable exceptions). Our findings contribute new evidence to fill this gap.
Second, the large empirical literature on the determinants of leverage is focussed mainly
on large, mostly listed, companies (see Graham, 2008). We study how corporate income
taxation affects the initial leverage of newly incorporated companies, providing the first
study based on a large sample of such companies.
Third, we estimate an augmented growth model, with leverage at entry as additional
independent variable, to examine the long-term effects of corporate income tax, through
initial leverage, on conditional (on survival) corporate growth. The transition from small
new company (’start-up’) to large growing company (’scale-up’) constitutes an important
determinant for productivity and aggregate growth (see Duruflé, Hellmann, and Wilson,
2017). The intensive effect (growth conditional on survival) is more important than the
extensive effect (survival) since it contributes disproportionately more to aggregate growth
(see Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2013, and Adelino, Ma, and Robinson, 2017). We
study how corporate income tax policy affects this transition through the choice of initial
leverage.
We assess two competing views of the desirability of leverage for young entrepreneurial
companies. One view is based on the well documented fact that innovative companies in
their early years of life are more likely to face financial distress (e.g., Cetorelli, 2009). This
occurs for a variety of reasons, including the need for experimentation and the correspond-
ing volatility of profits. Highly levered young firms are therefore potentially exposed to
an amplification of the negative real effects triggered by adverse firm-specific, industry-
specific, or macroeconomic shocks, for instance because of higher rollover risks and debt
overhang (see Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). This hypothesis predicts an adverse effect of
initial leverage on the conditional growth of young companies. A second view posits an al-
ternative mechanism, where access to debt reflects instead high firm quality and is therefore
positively correlated with future performance. As pointed out by Cole and Sokolyk (2018)
and by Robb and Robinson (2014), this would reflect the screening expertise of lenders
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able to identify and provide credit to new firms with superior performance prospects. A
positive relationship between debt and performance would also reflect lenders’ monitoring
ability and use of loan covenants that deter entrepreneurial misbehavior (Cetorelli and
Gambera, 2001). Which hypothesis is correct remains an open empirical question that we
take to the data.
From a methodological point of view, we exploit the information included in our data-
base to address two potential endogeneity problems that may affect our estimates: sample
selection and unobserved firm heterogeneity capturing firm quality.
We find several results that are novel to the literature. First, we document a high
variability in leverage at entry, whose mean and median levels are higher than for listed
companies in the US and in other countries (Fan, Titman, and Twite 2012). We also find
moderate evidence of convergence of leverage over time, up to nine years after incorpora-
tion. These findings show that young entrepreneurial companies behave differently from
large incumbents: they have higher leverage at entry and keep it high for several years
(Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008).
Second, we find that the corporate income tax, measured by the "effective average
tax rate" (EATR, see Devereux and Griffith, 1998), has a positive effect on the level of
leverage at entry that is statistically and economically significant. We employ the EATR as
it is a theoretically sounder measure than marginal tax rates for understanding corporate
financial decisions at entry, as we argue in section 2.3.2. In our preferred specification a
ten percentage point decrease in the EATR leads to a mean decrease in initial financial
leverage of 13.9 percentage points (median decrease: 9.3 percentage points). Such effect
is larger than what typically found for listed companies, which is however computed on
marginal tax rates that are not directly comparable with the EATR (see Feld, Heckemeyer,
and Overesch, 2013, for a survey). This evidence is consistently robust across a variety
of specifications and leverage definitions. We also find that the effect of the EATR on
leverage at entry is stronger in countries where creditors enjoy better protection in case
of default, and where there is more transparency in financial transactions. Protection of
creditor rights is known to ease the supply of funds, while transaction transparency is
known to discourage corporate tax elusion and tax evasion. Both are therefore expected
to bolster the effect of the EATR on observed initial leverage levels, as it turns out to be
the case.
Third, and most important, we find that a decrease in leverage at entry positively
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affects long-run growth, conditional on survival. When we impose a log-linear relationship
we find that a ten percentage point decrease in leverage at entry leads to an increase in
company assets size nine years after incorporation ranging from 1.6% to 2.1%. When we
allow for a more flexible log-quadratic functional form we find evidence of an inverted-U
relationship. This suggests that the probability of facing financing constraints increases
more than proportionally with respect to initial leverage, but only after a given threshold.
Below that threshold, the relationship between leverage at entry and growth is instead
positive. The estimated effect of a ten percentage point decrease in leverage at entry to
reach its mean (median) value is comparable in size to the one found in the log-linear spec-
ification, ranging from 1.8% to 2.1% (from 1.0% to 1.6%). This new evidence contributes
to a small but growing literature that documents the importance of initial conditions for
corporate growth (see Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Makimovic, 2017, and Sedlácˇek and
Sterk, 2018, among others).
We further ask under which conditions the effect we document is larger. We find that
the effect is larger in the sub-sample of companies located in countries where creditors enjoy
stronger protection rights, and where the level of transparency of economic and financial
transactions is higher. This result, in turn, contributes to the large literature on the role
of institutional quality for financial outcomes (see, for instance, Djankov, McLiesh, and
Shleifer, 2007, Bennedsen and Zeume, 2018, and Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock, 2015).
Overall, our results show an economically non-trivial effect of tax policy on the suc-
cessful scaling-up of entrepreneurial companies through leverage at entry that had so far
never been documented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 reports and discusses some descriptive evidence. Section 4 illustrates our empirical
strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses our econometric results and is followed by a
brief conclusion.
2 Data
2.1 Data sources and sample construction
Our first data source is the Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk. Amadeus
contains accounting data, legal form, industry activity codes, and incorporation date for
a large set of public and private companies in Europe. We base our analysis on the 2009
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and 2011 December releases of the database. We include companies from 38 two-digit
(NACE) industries in both manufacturing and industry-related services,1 incorporated in
fifteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
We consider only those companies that incorporated in the years from 1998 to 2001,
and follow them for nine years after incorporation. This implies that the initial leverage
choice for all four cohorts of firms was made in an expansionary period characterized by
strong credit availability. Figure 1 shows that in these four years European economies
were growing at a relative healthy rate: the dotted line marks the average growth rate in
the sample period, equal to 1.7%. We evaluate the growth performance of these companies
nine years later (2007-2010), conditional on survival. A nine year span allows for a proper
evaluation of long-term growth. It also allows us to include the years of the global finan-
cial crisis started in 2007 and the subsequent Great Recession (2008-2010) as a negative
shock to corporate growth, as in Dinlersoz et al., 2018, and Sedlácˇek and Sterk, 2018.
Figure 1 shows that these years were characterized by a sharp, and arguably unexpected,
contraction in economic growth.
Table 1 illustrates how we build our sample. We start with nearly 1.2 million newly
incorporated firms, fairly evenly distributed across the four years of incorporation, with
only a slight increase over time. We then apply two restrictions. First, we require informa-
tion on initial size, measured by total assets one year after incorporation; this more than
halves the initial sample due to smaller companies often not being required to file complete
financial accounts. Second, we also exclude very small companies, which are more likely
to exit the database over the sample period because they drop below the threshold size
required to file complete financial accounts. For this we exclude companies whose initial
size is below the sample median computed for all companies in the same cohort with avail-
able size data; these median values range between 109,00 and 122,000 euros, depending
on year.2 We end up with a sample of 250,814 companies, also fairly evenly distributed
across the four cohorts.
Table 2 reports the country composition of the sample. The first two columns report
1We include the following NACE rev. 1.1 industry codes: 15-36 (manufacturing), 40-41 (utilities), 45
(construction), and 50-52, 55, 60-64, 70-74 (services).
2By comparison, the average balance sheet size of the sample of entrepreneurial companies in Robb and
Robinson (2014) is very close at 109,000 dollars.
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the number and distribution of firms by country in the initial sample of nearly 1.2 mil-
lion entrants. The five largest EU economies account for a large fraction (77.74%) of our
sample, with the UK being the largest (25.86%) followed by Spain (16.67%), Germany
(12.89%), Italy (11.93%) and France (10.39%). The last two columns show the geograph-
ical distribution of our final sample. The total share of the five large economies remains
virtually unaltered (77.73%). However we observe a large decline for Italy (5.63% versus
11.93%) and especially for Germany (0.40% versus 12.89%). Symmetrically, we observe
an increase for the other three large economies: France (18.57% versus 10.39%), Spain
(23.77% versus 16.67%), and UK (29.36% versus 25.86%). This result is mainly driven
by the fact that German and Italian entrants are more likely not to have their balance
sheet data reported in the first few years after birth, because of lighter reporting rules for
private companies.
Our second data source is the “Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide” published annually
by Ernst & Young, a leading multinational tax consulting firm. We take from the Guides
information on statutory corporate tax rates and on statutory depreciation rates, at both
national and local level. These yearly publications are compiled by Ernst&Young’s local
offices in over 140 countries following common criteria, ensuring high professional stan-
dards and consistency both over time and across countries.
2.2 Dependent variables
We build two firm-level dependent variables: a measure of leverage and a measure of firm
growth. We examine them in turn.
2.2.1 Leverage
Our preferred measure for leverage is Financial Leverage (), which we compute as:
FinLev =
(Non Current Liabilities + Loans)
(Non Current Liabilities + Loans + Total Shareholders Funds)
This is the standard measure used in the literature on capital structure (Frank and
Goyal, 2009). We index variables by year of incorporation (t), and measure financial
leverage at entry in the first year after incorporation (+1). The use of the leverage
variable further reduces our sample size, as shown in the fourth line of Table 1. Our
baseline sample is thus composed of 205,618 companies.
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We also compute a broader measure of leverage at entry to test the robustness of our
results, where we substitute Current Liabilities for Loans in the definition of .
Current Liabilities is a broad aggregate which includes commercial debt and other cur-
rent liabilities, such as pension liabilities, taxes, and accounts payable.3 Total Leverage
() is therefore computed as:
TotLev =
(Non Current Liabilities + Current Liabilities)
(Non Current Liabilities + Current Liabilities + Total Shareholders Funds)
This measure is less satisfactory from a theoretical point of view, since it includes
liabilities which typically do not generate interest expenses that can be deducted for tax
purposes, like debts to suppliers and contractors. On the other hand, it provides an even
higher degree of comparability among countries by avoiding the risk that differences in
accounting rules or in aggregation practices affect the way the accounting item ’Loans’ is
computed in the Amadeus database. +1 also includes trade credit, which is poten-
tially important as a funding sources for entrepreneurial companies (Giannetti, Burkart,
and Ellingsen, 2011). Table 1 shows that the number of observations for +1 is just
marginally lower than for +1.
2.2.2 Firm growth
The second dependent variable we build is firm growth, which we measure by comparing
size after nine years (+9) from incorporation with initial size (+1). Size is mea-
sured as the log of total assets for two reasons. First, and more importantly, it is exactly
the growth in assets which is more likely to be directly hampered by the presence of fi-
nancing constraints (Cabral and Mata, 2003, and Myers, 1977). Second, alternative size
measures such as employment and sales are less satisfactory either because their coverage
in the Amadeus database is incomplete, as for employment, or because they are not a
reliable measure of initial size, as for sales one year after incorporation.
2.3 Independent variables
2.3.1 Firm-level variables
We use three firm-level variables as controls throughout the analysis. First, we use initial
size (+1). Second, we include two standard determinants of leverage: profitability and
3 In the Appendix we report the balance sheet structure available in Amadeus.
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tangibility (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Profitability at entry (+1) is measured
by the ratio of operating profits (losses) to total assets in the first year after incorporation.
Since we include the effect of the profitability rate on our measure of the effective corporate
tax rate, we can interpret +1 as a control for non-tax effects. Tangibility at
entry (+1) is measured by the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets in
the first year after incorporation. Note that both the size and the composition of assets,
proxied by +1 and +1, are firm-level choice variables and as such could
be potentially jointly determined with the composition of liabilities in the same period.
We discuss this issue in the empirical strategy section.
Finally, we build a variable that we use for the exclusion restriction in our growth
equation. The Accounting Inactive Ratio (+9) is an aggregate inverse measure of the
probability of “accounting survival” of a company in the Amadeus database, conditional
on its country and on its year of incorporation. This variable can be computed since
Amadeus reports the legal status of a company, which is “active” if the company is not
bankrupt, dissolved or in liquidation. We compute +9 as the ratio between the
number of companies incorporated in country  and year  that have active legal status,
but no accounting data for +9, and the number of all companies incorporated in
country  and year  that have active legal status.
2.3.2 The Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR)
Our main independent variable of interest captures the intensity of corporate income
taxation. Our aim is to obtain an accurate measure of the actual corporate income taxation
that affects firms’ leverage decision at entry. Obtaining such a measure is not immediate
for two reasons. The first is general and applies to all studies which aim at assessing
the effect of corporate income taxation on leverage: readily available measures are either
inaccurate (e.g., the statutory corporate tax rate) or endogenous to financial choices (e.g.,
the ratio of tax payments to taxable income). The second reason is specific to our study:
we need a measure at entry, when the company decides its initial capital structure without
having a previous taxable income record.
As Graham (2008) points out, even finding a solution to the general problem is inher-
ently difficult, and a widely accepted approach has not yet emerged. Possible solutions
take either of two routes. In the first one, the empirical strategy focuses on the effect
of corporate income taxation on incremental debt issuing decisions (see, for instance,
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MacKie-Mason, 1990). This approach simply requires the company to optimally react to
tax changes given its current financial structure, without assuming that the company con-
stantly rebalances its leverage ratio towards an optimal level. This approach uses lagged
tax measures in an attempt to avoid including the effect of contemporaneous debt decisions
on the tax measure itself. One such measure is Graham’s influential simulated Marginal
Tax Rate (MTR, see Graham, 1996a and 1996b), which relies on historic data to compute
a firm’s mean and variance of taxable income changes with the purpose of simulating
future firm-level pre-tax profits. The resulting lagged simulated MTR is a comprehen-
sive firm-level measure that incorporates non-debt tax shields such as carry-backwards,
carry-forwards, and tax credits. The second route focuses instead on measures of tax
rates before (’but for’) financing decisions, in order to bypass directly the endogeneity
of taxation issue. An example is provided by Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998),
who modify Graham’s MTR measure by running simulations on income before interest
expenses are deducted.4
To deal with our specific problem we exploit some features of both routes. First, as
noted by Graham (2008), we implicitly look at incremental debt issues since we study
the initial leverage decision of newly established companies. As common in the literature
which focuses on changes in debt levels, we deal with the simultaneity issue by using
lagged measures of tax status. At the same time, we also apply the ’but for’ approach by
using a comprehensive measure of taxation evaluated before financing decisions are taken,
the Effective Average Tax Rate () introduced by King and Fullerton (1984) and
developed by Devereux and Griffith (1998).
This measure has several advantages. First, it is comprehensive since it incorporates
both the tax rate and the elements which define the tax base (expected profitability, debt
and non-debt tax shields). Second, it is forward-looking, since it computes the effect of
taxation on economic returns over the entire life span of a stylized project. Third, it
does not require firm-level simulations of future profits, which are difficult to compute,
and possibly highly unreliable for newly established companies. Last, but not least, as
pointed out by Sorensen (2008), it is suitable when evaluating the effect of taxation on
firm decisions at the extensive margin, including firm location and firm entry. We measure
effective corporate income taxation in the year before incorporation (−1).
4The original simulated MTR is endogenous to financial decisions since simulations are based on pre-tax
profits, which are obviuoly negatively correlated with leverage.
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We construct the  as a ’but for’ measure by choosing a 100% equity financing
at incorporation. In principle, the  incorporates all non-debt tax shields, which
reduce the effective tax rate (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). They are also naturally
correlated with current profitability, which may create a downward bias in tax coefficients
if profitability is correlated with debt. Because of data limitations we can only include
directly one non-debt tax shield, depreciation. We also take into account, indirectly,
the effect of carry-forward of losses, which is a non-debt tax shield that is of material
importance for newly incorporated companies.
The size and distribution of the  depend on several assumptions about the
characteristics of the project and of the national tax system. We assume that the company
is resident and operates plant and machinery. Let ∗ and  be the pre-tax and post-tax
net present value of an investment project, respectively. The  is defined as the fall
in the rate of return of an investment induced by corporate taxation:
 = 
∗ −
∗
∗ incorporates the (forward-looking) rate of return on the investment which is as-
sumed to be industry-year specific but common across countries.5 We assume that the
industry-level profitability rate in the US constitutes a natural benchmark because of fewer
regulations and entry restrictions, and therefore a more competitive environment.
The after-tax value of the project () reflects the after-tax rate of return of the in-
vestment after the statutory corporate tax rate and depreciation rates are applied. In our
specifications we present results based on the maximum statutory corporate tax rate and
the maximum fiscal depreciation rate for plant and machinery in the year before incorpo-
ration. More details on the construction of the  variable can be found in Da Rin,
Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2011).
The  varies across industries, countries, and incorporation years. This allows
us to estimate its effect on leverage while controlling for industry, country, and year of
incorporation fixed effects, or for interactions among these.6
5∗ = −
1+ where  is the rate of return on the investment, in our case the industry profitability rate,
and  is the real interest rate (see Devereux and Griffith, 1998).
6An additional advantage of the  in our context is that it allows us to compute (industry-level)
expected profits even for companies that go out of business.
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3 Descriptive evidence
This section addresses the first objective of our research question. We provide for the
first time descriptive evidence on the initial leverage choice made by a large sample of
newly incorporated firms and on its dynamics in the nine years after incorporation. This
is of interest in its own right, since it contributes to the still small literature on the
corporate financial policy of young entrepreneurial companies. This descriptive evidence
also contributes to the literature on the dynamics of leverage (see DeAngelo and Roll,
2015, and Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015) by comparing companies at the same life cycle
point, therefore providing a natural anchor in the form of a choice of leverage made at the
incorporation of the firm.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our variables. For all variables at entry, we
cautiously employ data from the year after incorporation in order to obtain a meaningful
value. Using the year of incorporation would buy us one additional year for computing
long-term company growth, but would introduce the risk of employing values that corre-
spond to a transitional period when, for instance, the company may still be finalizing a loan
or equity fund-raising. +1 has similar mean (0.41) and median (0.37) values and
exhibits substantial variation, with at least a quarter of the sample firms reporting zero
leverage. +1 is substantially higher; its median value (0.85) is slightly more than
twice that of +1, and its mean value (0.76) is slightly less than twice. +1
also shows substantially smaller interquartile range, pointing to a lower variability of cur-
rent liabilities than loans.
Among firm-level independent variables, +1 shows substantial variation and an
asymmetric distribution with a thin right-tail of (relatively) large companies. Its median
value of 383,350 euros reflect the relatively small size of many sample firms, especially
considering that we only included those with more than 100,000 euros of assets at entry.
After nine years, the median firm increases its size by nearly 50%; the average firm grows
only slightly less. Firms in the first quartile grow much less. Note that the distribution
of +9 is based on a smaller sample, since it excludes over a third of companies for
which we do not observe total assets after nine years from incorporation, for economic
or for reporting reasons. +1 exhibits substantial variation and skewness, as it
is natural when looking at a sample that includes a wide variety of industries, spanning
both manufacturing and services. Its mean (0.26) is twice the median (0.12), and the
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level remains below 0.5 up to the third quartile. Also +1 exhibits substantial
dispersion, with a mean value (0.09) twice the median value (0.05). Notice that we measure
profitability from operating profits, which are a broad measure and explain the observed
positive values. +1 is available for only 75% of the sample due to missing data
for value added or total labor costs. +9 shows that, on average, 27.9% of companies
do not report their total assets nine years after incorporation, despite of their active legal
status at the same date. −1 is just above 30% in both mean and median terms,
and its inter-quartile range is 5.4 percentage points. Finally, the median number of years
losses can be carried forward (−1) is 10, with an interquartile range of 10
years.7
We provide additional evidence on the distribution of leverage from two different per-
spectives. First, in Table 4 we look at differences in leverage at entry across the four
cohorts. The sample is fairly evenly split across these years, with a slight increase of cov-
erage over time. The distribution of both +1 and +1 is remarkably stable
across cohorts, with very small changes at all points of the distribution. This reflects sta-
ble conditions in credit availability during the sample period. Unsurprisingly, +1
remains substantially lower than +1 across all four cohorts.
Tables 3 and 4 also allow us to compare the leverage levels of newly incorporated
companies in our sample to those found in other studies. The closest comparison is with
the data on US start-ups gathered by the Kaufman Foundation Survey and reported by
Robb and Robinson (2014). They report mean leverage at entry of around 0.47, slightly
higher than in our sample. Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011) report financial
data for a sample of 88,000 US private companies (mostly mature incumbents); these have
a mean (median) leverage of 0.31 (0.16). Our sample exhibits leverage values that are
somewhat intermediate between those of these two samples.
Second, we look into the dynamics of leverage over time from two different angles. First,
Figure 2 shows how  and  change over the nine years after incorporation.
We include only "survivors," that is companies that report either leverage variable for
all nine years. Panel A of Figure 2, reports the distribution over time of  and is
based on 85,740 companies. Panel B of Figure 2 reports the distribution of  and
7 In some countries, there is no upper limit to the number of years losses can be carried forward. In
these cases we imputed the maximum number of years observed in our sample conditional on the existence
of an upper limit (15 years).
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is based on 84,969 companies. These figures are slightly over 40% of those for which we
have  or  at entry. Panel A shows that  tends to decline over time
at all quartiles except the first one, which remains very close to zero. As a consequence,
there is a reduction of the inter-quartile range over time which points to a ’converge
from above only’ pattern. Panel B shows a similar pattern for , except that the
first quartile also declines over time, reaching a value close to 0.4 by end of the sample
period. In this case, the inter-quartile range increases. The decrease in  is therefore
more uniform. Our approach enables us provide a contribution to the recent literature on
leverage dynamics by comparing companies at the same life-cycle point. Recent studies
on capital structure dynamics often suffer from the lack of "a comparable relative position
in leverage cross-sections" (DeAngelo and Roll, 2015). Figure 2 provides such anchor
and shows that there is milder evidence of convergence over time that what reported by
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) for US listed companies. Interestingly, Dinlersoz et
al., 2018, also find a negative correlation between age and leverage in a large sample of of
US private companies.
A second angle to look at dynamics is through persistence. Table 5 reports the number
of firms that remain below the sample median of our leverage variables over the nine years
from incorporation, and their proportion of the initial number. The second and third
column of the table report data for . Almost two thirds (65.3%) of the firms
with +1 below the sample median (0.37) still report a value of  below that
sample median nine years after incorporation. The next two columns look at  and
provide an almost identical picture, with 64.5% of the companies with +1 below
the sample median (0.85) that remain below that value after nine years. This pattern
sharply contrasts with that of US listed companies, less than half of which exhibit the
same pattern over a ten-year span (see table 5 of DeAngelo and Roll, 2015).
Overall, the descriptive evidence we have documented implies that, regardless of the
chosen measure, leverage at entry is strongly correlated to leverage in future years. This
makes the analysis of the determinants of leverage at entry–including corporate taxation–
of great interest, since this initial choice does not appear easily reversible and therefore
might be expected to affect long-run company growth. We take this insight to the design
of our empirical strategy.
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4 Empirical strategy
We now turn to the two main objectives of our research question: studying how the
corporate income tax affects leverage at entry, and how leverage at entry, in turn, affects
the long-run growth of newly incorporated companies. We let the descriptive evidence of
Section 3 inform and guide our empirical strategy.
4.1 Leverage equation
We start by modelling the determinants of initial leverage noticing that leverage is a
“fractional” variable taking values in the unit interval with a positive probability mass at
zero. Following Papke and Wooldrige (1996), we therefore estimate the following fractional
Probit model:
(+1) = Φ(−1 + x0+1γ+
+ (DC ×DIY )0a1 + (DI ×DIY )0a2) (1)
where the expected value of financial leverage at entry ((+1)) for firm  in
country , industry  is a function of the logarithm of our taxation measure in country
 and industry  one year before incorporation (−1), and of three firm-specific
explanatory variables, contained in the vector x, that have been identified by the liter-
ature as being relevant determinants of capital structure (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009,
among others): initial size, profitability, and tangibility, all computed in the first year af-
ter incorporation. Additionally, we include two sets of fixed effects that interact the year
of incorporation dummy (DIY) with the country dummy (DC) and with the industry
dummy (DI) of firm . These fixed effects account for any possible systematic differ-
ences in leverage across year and country combinations, and across year and industry
combinations.
Though our sample includes relatively homogeneous Western European economies,
controlling for country fixed effects is important to account for differences in institutional
aspects that may affect leverage, such as reporting requirements and the quality of account-
ing practices. Industry fixed effects capture several factors that have been shown in the
literature to be relevant for the choice of leverage (see Mackay and Phillips, 2005). First,
industries themselves are important determinants of leverage; this is sometimes captured
by controlling for median industry-level leverage. Second, there are industry-level determi-
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nants of leverage that we cannot include given our sample structure. Since we look at the
initial leverage choice of newly incorporated firms, we cannot use the market-to-book ratio
as a proxy for investment opportunities. Similarly, we cannot use past firm-level variables
like sales growth or profit variability, which proxy for expected growth and for risk, re-
spectively. While we have provided evidence on the homogeneity of initial leverage across
cohorts, time fixed effects account for any remaining year differences in initial conditions
and exposure to economic variations through the nine-year span we look at. Interacting
year of incorporation fixed effects with country and industry dummies therefore allow us
to account for any differences in these fine-grained effects over time.
The function Φ() is chosen to be a standard normal cumulative distribution function,
so to ensure that the predicted values from equation (1) lie in the unit interval.8 In the
estimation of equation (1) we assume that unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level is or-
thogonal to all explanatory variables, including our country-industry-year specific taxation
measure. Such assumption may not hold if policy-makers anticipate a country-industry
clustered increase (decrease) in leverage and adjust the effective tax rate accordingly (one
year before incorporation). This might happen, for instance, if policy-makers are induced
to increase (decrease) the tax rate or the tax base in response to the forecast of entry of
excessively under-capitalized (over-capitalized) firms. In this case taxation and leverage
may be simultaneously determined and taxation should be considered endogenous in our
model of leverage determinants. Under this scenario–unlikely as it might be–our chosen
estimator is expected to underestimate , and this in turn suggests that our estimates
should be considered as lower bounds of the true effect. Also, contrary to linear models,
consistent estimates of the marginal effects for the  in the fractional Probit require
all other control variables to be exogenous. This assumption holds only if the size and the
composition of assets (i.e. tangibility) are pre-determined with respect to the composi-
tion of liabilities (i.e. leverage). This is more likely to occur in expansionary periods like
the one we chose for our sample (1998—2001) since the severity of financing constraints
is known to be counter-cyclical. Still, to address this legitimate concern in the empirical
section, we also report the average marginal effects based on a linearized version of (1)
estimated with OLS.
8The parameters  and  are consistently estimated using the Bernoulli quasi-ML estimator proposed
by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), conditional on equation (1) being correctly specified. We use robust
inference by computing standard errors clustered at the country-industry level.
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4.2 Growth equation
We now turn to the third objective of our research question, and investigate the role of
the initial choice of leverage on long-run corporate growth. For this, we follow the sample
of entrants over time and take to the data the following relationship, which is a simple
augmented growth equation:
+9 = +1 + x0+1ζ+
+ (DC ×DI ×DIY )0λ+ +9 (2)
where firm size nine years after incorporation of firm  (+9) is explained by leverage
at entry (+1) and by the variables contained in the vector x, all observed at entry:
initial size, tangibility and profitability. Equation (2) can also be seen as an investigation
on whether firm initial conditions predict long-term success. We add financial leverage
to other types of initial conditions studied by Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic,
2017 (size), Bloom et al., 2013 (management quality), Lee, Moon, and Oh, 2018 (R&D
competence), Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang, 2013 (size and productivity), and Sedlácˇek
and Sterk, 2018 (employment), among others. As we did for model (1), we also include
fixed effects for country (DC), industry (DI) and incorporation year (DIY). Since all
explanatory variables vary at the firm level, we are able to introduce their triple interaction,
unlike in equation (1). The triple interaction allows us to control for any industry-country
specific shocks facing each cohort of firms. This is a very powerful approach, which allows
us to eliminate many possible alternative interpretations of the data, as it controls for a
very large set of potentially unobserved factors at a very granular level.
Two problems may arise when estimating equation (2) that would affect the consistent
estimation of the parameters of interest: sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity
capturing firm quality. First, selection issues may arise because of survivorship bias. We
are able to observe accounting data nine years after incorporation for about two thirds of
our initial sample of entrants. There may be different reasons for this: companies may
go bankrupt, dissolve, or liquidate, they can fall below the reporting threshold, and there
can also be delays in reporting more recent accounting data. According to the data on
legal status in the Amadeus database, about 89% of the original sample of entrants are
still active at the end of 2009. We therefore conjecture that the unreported data on size
at nine years after incorporation are partially explained by delays in reporting accounting
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information.9
We account for selection issues by estimating a two-step Heckman selection model
(Heckman, 1979). The selection equation models the selection mechanism, i.e., the variable
of interest +9 is only observed if the selection indicator  is equal to one:
+9 = Φ(+1 + x0+1μ+ +9
+ (DC)0π1 + (DI ×DIY )0π2) (3)
where +9 is a binary variable indicating whether firm  has accounting data
nine years after incorporation and x is the usual vector of control variables. We also
include the Accounting Inactive Ratio variable (+9), which measures the share of
active companies with no accounting data over the total number of active companies in
a particular country-year couple. +9 appears only in the selection equation to en-
sure the validity of the exclusion restriction. Our assumption is that the +9 reflects
exclusively exogenous country-year idiosyncrasies in the updating of the database and is
not therefore a proxy for unobservable factors affecting firm growth. If this is the case we
expect +9 to affect the probability of observing +9 at the firm level (the selec-
tion equation), but not to affect the expectation of +9 conditional on observability
(the outcome equation). We additionally control for country fixed effects, and for the
interaction of industry and year of incorporation fixed effects.10
The second issue we need to tackle in the estimation of equation (2) is the potential
endogeneity of the initial leverage. This concern is typically overlooked in the firm-level
empirical literature which investigates the role of initial conditions on firm’s future perfor-
mance. The implicit rationale for this is grounded on the observation that the error term
in equation (2) is dated at time + 9, that is nine years after firm’s initial conditions are
set. Unobservable factors at entry are therefore allowed to be correlated with observable
initial conditions under the maintained assumption that these factors are transitory (i.e.
9Our conjecture is supported by the fact that the amount of missing data increases in more recent years.
Only 11% of the missing data for size refers to the year 2007, while 43% of the missing data for size is for
the year 2010.
10A legitimate alternative option would be to estimate our two equation system jointly by Full Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood, under a joint normality assumption of the error terms in the main and in the
selection equation. Indeed, if we do so the results we present in Table 9 are virtually unaltered. However
we focus on the two-step approach in order to make the results fully comparable with those obtained by
allowing initial leverage to be endogenous. In this case the FIML approach is in general hard to apply.
More specifically, models estimated with FIML fail to converge in our application.
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(+9|) = 0). This is not the case, for instance, if the error term captures time-invariant
unobserved firm heterogeneity that is potentially correlated to initial leverage. The po-
tential bias in the estimated effects of initial leverage on long run growth may be either
upward or downward. The bias may be upward if ex-ante higher quality companies obtain
higher equity financing resources, and the observed relationship between lower leverage
and higher growth may therefore be spurious, due to unobserved firm quality. The bias
may also be downward if risk-averse entrepreneurs, who are expected to enter with low
leverage, are characterized by lower levels of growth because of the unobserved risk aver-
sion. While including some proxies of firm quality, i.e. size, tangibility and profitability
at entry, may weaken concerns for this source of endogeneity, we argue that further ex-
ploration for a more rigorous approach to deal with the endogeneity of initial leverage
is advisable. As we discuss more thoroughly in the next section, we therefore borrow
from the literature on financial dependence and growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and
construct a set of instruments based on the availability of data on leverage and external
financial dependence for a sample of mature large UK companies.
5 Results
5.1 Leverage equation
5.1.1 Baseline model
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equation (1) with our preferred leverage vari-
able, +1 as dependent variable. As we discuss in Section 4.1, this model controls
for additive fixed effects given by the interaction of country and year of incorporation and
by the interaction of industry and year of incorporation which allow us to control for a
rich set of economic effects. Standard errors are clustered at industry-country level.
We let the  enter either linearly (columns (i) and (ii)) or quadratically (columns
(iii) and (iv)) in the underlying latent specification. The quadratic form allows for the
marginal effects to change sign over the distribution, providing a more flexible structure
than the linear specification, which imposes a constant sign over the whole distribution.
Moreover, columns (i) and (iii) include only initial size (+1) as control variable,
whereas in columns (ii) and (iv) the vector of control variables is expanded to include the
firm’s share of tangible assets (+1) and firm profitability (+1).
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The inclusion of these additional control variables reduces the sample size considerably,
by about 55,000 observations, since some of the accounting items needed to compute these
variables are not available for a non-negligible number of companies.11
In the linear specification the coefficient of −1 is positive, and significantly so,
both in column (i) and in column (ii). In the lower part of the Table we report the
corresponding distribution of marginal effects, whose mean value equals 0.030 and 0.027,
respectively. As we discuss in Section 4.1, in non-linear models, unlike in linear models,
the endogeneity of the control variables would bias the estimator for the coefficient of
−1. For this reason, in the last row of Table 6 we also report the (constant)
marginal effects based on a linearized version of (1) estimated with OLS.12 The estimated
effects are comfortingly very similar: 0.032 (vs. 0.030) for column (i) and 0.027 (vs. 0.027)
for column (ii).
These results are broadly confirmed in the quadratic specifications in −1 re-
ported in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 6. Note first that we reject the null hypothesis
of a linear specification since in both columns the estimated coefficients on the quadratic
term are significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels. The mean
marginal effects retain their positive sign but become smaller–more so in the specifica-
tion of column (iv), where the full set of control variables is included. The estimated
mean marginal effects are 0.018 in column (iii) and 0.014 in column (iv). The estimated
mean marginal effects for the linearized version of the model estimated with OLS are also
smaller than those of the linear specifications, but slightly larger than those based on
the Papke and Woolridge (1996) estimator both in column (iii)–0.020 vs. 0.018–, and
in column (iv)–0.015 vs. 0.014.13 In our preferred, more flexible and less parsimonious
11Comfortingly, however, the median initial size for this sub-sample of firms (367,000 euros) is only
marginally smaller compared to the median size of the sub-sample of firms for which information on
tangibility and profitability is available (390,000 euros).
12The OLS estimator for  is consistent if (|xD) = (|xD) where D includes country,
industry and cohort dummies.
13We also extend the baseline model by including −1 as additional explanatory variable.
This non-debt tax shield should in principle be included in the . However, we do not observe all the
specific accounting details necessary to compute the reductions in the tax base associated to these provi-
sions. Nevertheless, in order to check that our results are not driven by the exclusion of this component, we
include the one element that we observe for all country-years, namely the log-transformed number of years
allowed for loss carryforwards. All our results are substantially confirmed. When significant, the estimated
parameter on this variable enters with a negative sign, as expected. Detailed results are available in the
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specification (column (iv)) a ten percentage point decrease in the EATR leads therefore to
a mean (median) decrease in initial financial leverage of 13.9 percentage points (9.3 p.p.).
Coming to the control variables, in all four equations their coefficients are significantly
different from zero at conventional significance levels. +1 and +1 enter
with a positive sign and +1 enters with a negative sign in all columns where
they are included. In the empirical literature on the determinants of leverage, the positive
relationship between leverage and tangibility is rationalized by the fact that tangible assets
can be used as collateral in lending agreements. This, in turn, makes access to credit easier
or less costly, an effect that is arguably stronger for small and young firms. The negative
relationship between leverage and profitability—taken as a proxy for the availability of
internal funds— is instead commonly associated to the pecking-order theory, which predicts
substitutability between cash flow and debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The fact that this
relationship also holds for firms in their initial stage of operations is novel to the literature.
5.1.2 Extensions and robustness
Table 7 replicates the analysis of Table 6 using +1 as dependent variable. We
do this with the purpose of checking that our previous results continue to hold when
using a measure of leverage which, though theoretically less satisfactory, is less likely to
suffer from measurement errors associated with potential differences in accounting rules
across countries. The mean marginal effects of  on +1 remain positive and
similar in size to those of Table 6 in all specifications. The estimates range between 0.022
and 0.029 when we employ the Papke and Wooldridge estimator, and between 0.023 and
0.032 when we instead apply the OLS estimator. As to the control variables, +1
changes sign from positive to negative, whereas +1 retains its negative sign
in all columns where it is included. Finally, the coefficients on +1 are not
significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels.
Table 8 reports results of models where we test whether the coefficients of −1
and the implied marginal effects are constant or vary across sets of countries with different
levels of nstitutional quality. These models provide useful evidence on whether and to what
degree the response of leverage to corporate income taxation is country-specific (Giannetti,
2003). They explore two different country-level mechanisms through which the 
can affect the leverage decision. The rationale for this exercise is that a reduction in
Appendix (Table A1).
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corporate income taxation might be more effective in countries with a higher degree of
creditor protection or with more transparency in corporate transactions. Stronger creditor
rights should ease the supply of funds (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007), therefore
amplifying the effect of a change in the  on the equilibrium level of leverage. A
different mechanism might operate through transparency. A more transparent financial
environment discourages tax elusion and tax evasion (Bennedsen and Zeume, 2018, Hanlon,
Maydew, and Thornock, 2015); this, in turn, makes the tax deductibility of debt more
valuable to companies, and we therefore expect that it increases the effect of the 
on leverage at entry.
We thus expand our baseline model by introducing interaction terms between−1
and  − −1 and two binary variables capturing institutional differences: HIGH-
CREDITOR-RIGHTS and HIGH-TRANSPARENCY. HIGH-CREDITOR-RIGHTS is built
on the creditor rights index by Djankov et al. (2007). This index varies between 0 and 4,
with higher values corresponding to stronger creditor rights. HIGH-CREDITOR-RIGHTS
equals 1 if the index takes a value equal to 3 or 4 in a firm’s country in the year before
incorporation, and 0 otherwise. HIGH-TRANSPARENCY is based on the Transparency
index by Francis et al. (2009). The index aims to capture the corporate information
environment of a country. It is based on a number of disclosure, information acquisition
and dissemination factors that include financial accounting disclosures, auditing activ-
ity, financial analyst coverage, insider trading enforcement, and media coverage. The
index ranges between 1 and 37 and a higher index indicates higher transparency. HIGH-
TRANSPARENCY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a country’s Transparency index is
larger than its median value in our sample, and 0 otherwise.
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 8 show the results for the linear and the quadratic model
when we interact −1 with HIGH-CREDITOR-RIGHTS. In both specifications we
include the full set of control variables. The interaction term is positive and significant at
the 10% level in the linear specification. However, the two interaction terms are neither
individually nor jointly significant at any conventional significance level in our preferred
quadratic specification. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 8 perform a similar exercise where
we interact −1 with HIGH-TRANSPARENCY. Here we find that the interaction
terms are significant both in the linear and in the quadratic specification. The distribution
of the implied marginal effects clearly indicates that −1 has a much larger effect
in those countries where the level of transparency and, to a lesser extent, the degree of
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creditor rights are higher. This suggests that a country’s institutional setting is important
for the effect of −1 on leverage.14
5.2 Growth equation
5.2.1 Baseline linear model
We now turn to the last, and more ambitious, objective of our research question,the role of
leverage at entry for long-run corporate growth. In this section we discuss the estimates of
equations (2) and (3). Table 9 reports baseline results grounded on a linear specification,
whereas Table 10 reports a number of extensions and robustness checks. Finally, Table 11
allows the functional form to depend on country-specific institutional features, along the
lines of Table 8.
In Table 9, the dependent variable is our corporate growth measure, +9, and
+1 is now the main explanatory variable of interest. We report six different speci-
fications of equation (2). We first estimate equation (2) with OLS (columns (i) to (iv)). In
columns (i) and (ii) we include country-year of incorporation and industry-year of incor-
poration fixed effects in order to control for country-wide and industry-wide time varying
unobservable variables that may affect firm growth. Columns (iii) and (iv) include an even
more granular structure for the fixed effects, which allows us to control for any industry-
country-cohort specific shock. This means that shocks which are industry-country specific
are controlled for separately for each cohort of firms. In columns (v) and (vi) we then
address the sample selection problem and estimate equations (2) and (3) by applying the
Heckman two-step approach, as discussed in Section 4.2. To achieve convergence in these
specifications we control only for country, and industry-year of incorporation specific fixed
effects.
14We also estimate additional equations where  is interacted with two geographical binary vari-
ables,  and .  takes the value of one if a firm is located in Northern Europe,
and zero otherwise.  takes the value of one if a firm is located in one of Europe’s core countries,
and zero othewise (see Camacho, Perez-Quiros, and Saiz, 2006). These partitions are different from those
corresponding to the creditor rights and financial transparency variables, and allow us to test whether our
finding on the role played by creditor rights and transaprency does not simply proxy for other economic
and cultural differences. We find that in both linear and quadratic specifications, the interacted variables
are not statistically significant, suggesting that our main results do not reflect generic geographical effects.
Also, in the quadratic specifications we do not reject the null that both interacted terms are jointly equal
to zero. The results are reported in Table A2 of the Appendix.
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The reported estimates therefore vary across columns because of different estimation
methods and because the vector of control variables changes across specifications. We
report specification both without (columns (i), (iii) and (v)) and with ((columns (ii), (iv)
and (vi)) +1 and +1. We include +1 in all specifications.
The main reason why we include tangibility and profitability–despite the loss of ob-
servations and the concerns about their exogeneity we discuss in Section 4.2–is that both
variables can be taken as proxies for firm quality at entry, thus contributing to addressing
the endogeneity problem stemming from the omission of relevant unobservable variables
affecting both +1 and +9.
The main finding of Table 9 is that +1 has a consistently negative effect on
+9, after controlling for +1 and, in some specifications, for +1 and
+1. The size of this effect varies across specifications. Point estimates range
from −0156 to −0207 when the main equation is estimated with OLS. Accounting for the
possible sample selection with the Heckman two-step estimator does not make much dif-
ference, since the implied coefficients are very similar to those obtained with OLS (−0167
and −0207). Given the imposed log-linear specification, a reduction of ten percentage
points in leverage is therefore associated to an increase in long-term growth ranging from
1.56% to 2.07%. The fact that Mills’ lambda is not significantly different from zero in
both columns suggests that sample selection is not a serious issue in our case.
The additional control variables, +1, +1 and +1 enter
with the expected positive sign in all specifications. This implies that both initial prof-
itability and initial tangibility have some predictive power for future survival and growth.
As to initial size, the estimated coefficient is smaller than one. This confirms the well-
known fact that larger companies tend to grow (comparatively) less than smaller companies
(Adelino, Ma, and Robinson, 2017, and Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2013).
When focusing on the selection equation, we find that +9 enters with the expected
negative sign and it is statistically significant in both specifications. +1 has a neg-
ative effect on the probability of observing +9, but significantly so only in column
(vi), which has a smaller number of observations as discussed in Section 4.2. The corre-
sponding mean marginal effect (unreported) is small: a ten percentage point increase in
financial leverage at entry is associated with a fall in the probability of observing +9
of −025%. Since the unobservability of assets nine years after incorporation could also
be interpreted as a negative sign of "accounting survival," we refrain from giving these
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marginal effects an economic interpretation, even if the model controls for systematic
cross-country differences in updating times through +9.
5.2.2 Extensions and robustness
We now report a battery of additional estimates that address a variety of potential con-
cerns with our growth equation. First, we substitute +1 with +1 as our
main explanatory variable of interest. thus allowing for the possibility that what matters
in the growth equations is the overall debt burden, rather than just financial debt. In
columns (i) and (ii) in Table 10 we then re-estimate columns (iii) and (iv) in Table 9
with +1 replacing +1. The coefficients of +1 have a negative sign
and their magnitudes are roughly comparable to the ones reported in Table 9 (−0176 vs
−0156 and −0308 vs −0199), providing evidence that our results are robust to alterna-
tive definitions of leverage.
Second, we exploit the fact that the four cohorts of newly incorporated firms were
exposed differently to the 2007 financial crisis and the Great Recession which followed in
2008-2010. Figure 1 shows that the growth rate of the EU—15 countries took a consistent
dive starting in 2008, with a negative average growth rate, which persisted until 2010.
Since the growth of companies belonging to the first cohort is evaluated at the end of 2007
whereas growth for companies in the last cohort is evaluated at the end of 2010, one might
argue that recent cohorts were more exposed to the negative macroeconomic shock for two
reasons. First, they were exposed to the recession for a longer period. Second, they faced
the shock at a younger age, when they were likely to be less resilient to adverse conditions.
On these grounds, in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 10 we report the results of an extended
model where +1 is interacted with cohort dummies. This allows the effect of initial
leverage to vary as a function of the intensity of exposure to the negative shock triggered
by the 2007 financial crisis. All interaction terms are statistically insignificant. We also
cannot reject the null that they are jointly equal to zero. We conclude that using aggregate
macroeconomic conditions to identify differential effects across cohorts is not very powerful
in our application.
Third, our results so far do not provide evidence in favor of a causal positive effect
of an early access to financial credit on future growth, as suggested by Cole and Sokolyk
(2018). This, however, might depend on the fact that initial leverage is not a suitable
variable to capture the favorable role that credit access at entry can have through quality
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certification and monitoring. Similarly, it might be argued that it is the linear functional
form between leverage and future performance not to be appropriate, since these positive
effects are plausibly non-linear in leverage and are at work only when leverage remains
relatively low. To address these issues we follow Cole and Sokolyk (2018), and replace
+1 with the binary variable they use in their study to measure credit access. We
define +1, to be equal to 1 if a firm obtained financial credit at entry (+1) and
0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients are reported in columns (v) and (vi) of Table 10,
and show no role for early credit access on future growth.
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimate columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 9 al-
lowing a quadratic specification for +1. We report the results in columns (vii) and
(viii) of Table 10. We find that the coefficients on both the linear and the quadratic terms
are significantly different from zero. They point to an inverted-U relationship between
+9 and +1. This, in turn, suggests that the probability of facing financing
constraints because of rollover risks and debt overhang is likely to increase more than
proportionally in the debt burden, but only after a given threshold. Below that threshold,
the relationship between leverage at entry and growth remains positive.15 Such evidence
suggests that the quality certification and monitoring hypothesis put forward by Cole and
Sokolyk (2018) operates only below a certain level of initial leverage. These results imply
that the estimated effect on corporate growth of a ten percentage point decrease in leverage
at entry, computed to reach the mean (median) initial leverage from above, is comparable
in size to the one found in the log-linear specification and it ranges from 1.8% to 2.1%
(from 1.0% to 1.6%). Since the imputed decrease in leverage corresponds approximately
to a ten percentage points decrease in EATR, from Table 6, we conclude that the indirect
impact of corporate taxation on growth through leverage is economically non-negligible.
As mentioned in the previous section, it might be argued that despite the inclusion of
profitability and tangibility as proxies for firm quality, the growth equations we presented
so far still suffer from a residual endogeneity problem associated to the fact that both
the initial leverage choice and future growth prospects are determined by a time-invariant
unobserved firm-level component that we cannot control for. To address this concern we
borrow from the literature on the effects of financial dependence on growth (Rajan and Zin-
gales, 1998, Hadlock and Pierce, 2010, Brown, Cookson, and Heimer, 2017) and construct
15The estimated thresholds equal 0.35 in column (vii) an 0.29 in column (viii). Both are lower than the
median (0.37) and the mean (0.41) levels of +1.
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two instruments based on industry-level measures of ’optimal’ leverage and ’structural’
external financial dependence. We identify such values from data on incumbent large UK
companies. We measure leverage of incumbents as  over the 1998-2001 period. We
measure external financial dependence () as the firm-year level difference between
capital expenditures and cash flows from operations, divided by capital expenditures, over
the 1998-2001 period. Under the assumption that capital markets in the UK are rela-
tively frictionless for large companies, this method allows us to identify industry-specific
benchmark levels of leverage and external financial dependence which are exogenous with
respect to the unobservable characteristics of the newly incorporated firms in our sample.
We then compute ’optimal’ leverage ( − − ) as the industry-
level median value of  for large incumbent UK companies, and ’structural’ external
financial dependence ( − − ) as the industry-level median value
of  for large incumbent UK companies. A firm is defined as ’large’ in the Amadeus
database if it fulfills the size criteria adopted by Eurostat.16 We obtain our instruments
by interacting these two industry-level variables with the measure of Transparency we
introduced in Section 5.1.2.
We report the results for this exercise in columns (ix) and (x) of Table 10, where
we estimate a 2SLS model where equation (2) is the growth equation. Estimates for
the growth equation are reported under column (ix) and for the corresponding first-stage
equation under column (x). Estimates of the parameters of +1 and +1−
are substantially higher than their OLS counterparts. They are both significantly different
from zero and also point to a inverted-U relationship, thus confirming our previous findings.
The threshold for the change in the sign of the effect of +1 interest is higher than
the ones estimated in columns (vii) and (viii) (0.49 vs. 0.35 and 0.29, respectively), but still
in the admissible range. However, the estimated size of the effect is implausibly large even
when evaluated in the proximity of the leverage value (0.49) associated to the maximum
of +9. In this case a ten percentage point decrease in leverage at entry leads to a
24.1% decrease in corporate growth. Estimated effects grow obviously even larger when
evaluated away from the maximum of +9. One potential reason for this drawback is
the insufficient strength of our instruments. It is now well known in the literature that
critical values for robust F-statistics are not available for the case of multiple endogenous
regressors and multiple instruments (Montiel Olea and Pflueger, 2013). For this reason at
16See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Enterprise_size
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the bottom of column (x) we report several F-statistics that are robust to deviations from
the standard homoskedasticy assumption. Despite the unavailability of rigorous hypothesis
testing, the very low value of the F-statistic robust to clustering (5.12) suggests that this
is indeed the case. For this reason, in what follows we choose to use the results reported in
columns (vii) and (viii) as benchmarks to test for the stability of our preferred quadratic
specification when applied to subsets of countries sharing common institutional features
5.2.3 Exploiting cross-country differences
Our main finding so far is the existence of an inverted-U relationship between initial
leverage and size nine years after incorporation, conditional on initial size. We close
our study by exploring the additional hypothesis that this functional form may apply
differently to new companies depending of their country’s institutional setting. This allows
us to contribute to the literature on country-level institutional conditions and corporate
growth (see, among others, Cornaggia et al., 2015).
Given that we are studying corporate financial policy decisions, we build on our ar-
guments in Section 5.1.2 and look into whether the curvature of this relationship is more
pronounced in countries where the effect of  on leverage is expected to be stronger.
We expect this to be where creditor rights are more strongly enforced (credit supply chan-
nel), or where economic and financial exchanges occur in a more transparent environment
(tax elusion/evasion reduction channel). An obvious implication of this hypothesis is that
the effect of corporate income taxation on firm growth through leverage may not be ho-
mogenous across countries, but depends instead on observable country-level institutional
characteristics. We also consider the possibility that, even within a country, the curvature
of the relationship between initial leverage and size nine years after incorporation might
differ depending on initial company size. This may be due to the role size at entry plays
in determining the likelihood of financing (see Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).
To examine these hypotheses, we estimate additional specifications of equation (2)
where +1 and +1 −  are interacted with country-level measures of insti-
tutional quality. Table 11 reports the results. In columns (i) and (ii) the interaction is
with initial size (+1). In columns (iii) and (iv) the interaction is with initial size and
with the dummy for strong creditor rights that we introduced in Section 5.1.2 (HIGH-
CREDITOR-RIGHTS). In columns (v) and (vi) the interaction is with initial size and
with the dummy for high transparency of economic transactions that we introduced in
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Section 5.1.2 (HIGH-TRANSPARENCY).
Across columns, most interaction terms are significantly different from zero. Since dou-
ble and triple interactions make the interpretation of estimated coefficients cumbersome,
we take a visual approach and use Figures 3, 4, and 5 to show the estimated quadratic
relationships associated to the coefficient estimates reported in Table 11.
Figure 3 is based on the estimates reported in column (i). It shows that the curvature
of the relationship is more pronounced for companies with a larger size at entry. In Figure
4 we then allow this relationships to vary with the degree of creditor rights, based on the
estimates reported in column (iii), and in Figure 5 we allow this relationships to vary with
the degree of transparency. Figure 4 shows that the curvature is more pronounced for
firms operating in more creditor-friendly institutional settings and this applies, at least to
a certain degree, irrespective of size at entry. A similar, only slightly weaker, result arises
from Figure 5.
We draw the following conclusions from these findings. First, we uncover a composite
effect of leverage on corporate growth. The inverted-U relationship is consistent with both
the quality certification and monitoring effect and the financing constraint effect, at least
in countries endowed with good economic institutions. Figures 4 and 5 show that the
first effect prevails at lower levels of initial leverage, as documented by the initial positive
slope of the estimated functions, whereas the second effect becomes predominant at higher
levels of initial leverage, when the probability of financial distress is likely to grow more
than proportionally with respect to the level of initial leverage. A second conclusion is
more relevant from a policy perspective. Exogenous changes to initial leverage, possibly
following changes in corporate income taxation, are likely to have a stronger effect on
growth for companies located in countries with stronger creditor rights or with more
transparency. However, since this effect is non-linear, a reduction in corporate income
taxation, by making the access to debt less appealing, might lead to an increase or to a
decrease in long-term growth, through initial leverage, depending on where each company
is located on the relevant curve.
6 Conclusion
A large cross-country empirical literature has documented that entrepreneurial companies’
demography is significantly different across countries in terms of birth rates, survival
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rates, and growth, and that these demographic patterns are influenced by country-specific
institutions and policies (see, among others, Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007, Demirgüç-
Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic, 2006, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006). Recent empirical
evidence shows that corporate income taxation is an important determinant both of entry
rates (Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli, 2011; Djankov et al., 2010) and of entrants’
size (Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, however,
far less is known about the effect of this policy instrument on firms’ survival and long-term
growth. This is unfortunate, since the scaling-up of young firms into large companies is
an important factor contributing to aggregate economic growth.
In this paper we study this issue and focus on a specific channel through which cor-
porate income taxation can have long-term real effects: the choice of financial leverage
at entry. On the one hand, high levels of leverage reflect lenders’ screening, monitoring,
and certification of firm quality, which enhance future growth prospects. On the other
hand, high levels of leverage increase the probability of financial distress, and potentially
bankruptcy. We show that both these economic mechanisms are present in our data, and
that initial financial conditions matter for long-term outcomes. We find that a reduction
in the corporate income tax rate enhances the long-term growth of newly incorporated
companies by reducing initial leverage through the non-neutrality of interest deductibility,
but only when initial leverage is above a given threshold. We also find that this effect is
larger (at higher levels of initial leverage) for companies located in countries where cred-
itors enjoy stronger rights and where the level of economic and financial transparency is
higher. This points to the relevance of the institutional context for the interpretation of
our main result. It also points to the need to further explore the interplay of corporate
tax policy with institutional aspects that may affect its effectiveness.
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Figure 1. GDP growth rates in EU-15 countries
This figure shows the GDP growth rates in the EU-15 countries over the period 1996-2017 (source:
Eurostat). The dashed line represents the average GDP growth rate over this period (1.7%). The
grey areas highlight the years under study: 1998-2001 (incorporation year), and 2007-2010(evaluation
years).
Figure 2. Distribution of FinLev and TotLev over time
Panel A shows the distribution of financial leverage (FinLev) for the whole sample over time, from
the first to the ninth year after incorporation. Panel B shows the distribution of total leverage
(TotLev) for the whole sample over time, from the first to the ninth year after incorporation. We
restrict the analysis to the subset of firms that report information on Leverage ratios for all nine
years after incorporation (85,740 firms for FinLev, and 84,969 firms for TotLev).
Panel A. Distribution of FinLev
Panel B. Distribution of TotLev
Figure 3. Predicted Sizet+9 for different levels of initial size (Sizet+1) and
initial financial leverage (FinLevt+1)
This figure shows the predicted values for Sizet+9 as a function of initial financial leverage
(FinLevt+1), for three different levels of initial size (Sizet+1): the first quartile (Q1), the me-
dian, and the third quartile (Q3). The figure is based on estimates from Table 11, column (i).
Figure 4. Predicted Sizet+9 for different levels of initial size (Sizet+1),
initial financial leverage (FinLevt+1), and creditors’ rights.
This figure shows the predicted values for Sizet+9 as a function of initial financial leverage
(FinLevt+1), for three different levels of initial size (Sizet+1): the first quartile (Q1), the me-
dian, and the third quartile (Q3). The left panel reports values for low creditor rights countries,
and the right panel reports values for high creditor rights countries. The figure is based on estimates
from Table 11, column (iii).
Figure 5. Predicted Sizet+9 for different levels of initial size (Sizet+1),
initial financial leverage (FinLevt+1), and transparency.
This figure shows the predicted values for Sizet+9 as a function of initial financial leverage
(FinLevt+1), for three different levels of initial size (Sizet+1): the first quartile (Q1), the me-
dian, and the third quartile (Q3). The left panel reports values for low transparency countries,
and the right panel reports values for high transparency countries. The figure is based on estimation
results from Table 11, column (v).
Table 1. Sample construction
This table shows the count of companies at different steps in the sample construction, as described in Section 2.
Variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The median initial size, measured by total assets, for each cohort is:
109,000 Euros (1998), 122,000 Euros (1999), 115,000 Euros (2000), and 122,000 Euros (2001).
Number of Firms: 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
All entrants 256,529 287,070 330,798 336,434 1,210,831
With initial size 96,677 119,475 143,465 153,747 513,364
Initial size > median 47,217 58,378 70,054 75,165 250,814
FinLevt+1 38,166 47,749 57,584 62,119 205,618
FinLevt+9 20,355 21,362 23,751 20,272 85,740
TotLevt+1 37,380 46,615 56,010 60,309 200,314
TotLevt+9 20,371 21,118 23,449 20,031 84,969
Table 2. Country coverage
This table shows the count and distribution of companies by country. ’All entrants’ refers to the first line of Table 1
(1,210,831 companies). Final sample refers to the third line of Table 1 (250,814 companies).
All entrants Final sample
Country Firms % Firms %
Austria 12,202 1.01 19 0.01
Belgium 55,750 4.60 22,684 9.04
Denmark 28,075 2.32 0 0.00
Finland 14,432 1.19 305 0.12
France 125,830 10.39 46,574 18.57
Germany 156,044 12.89 1,003 0.40
Greece 4,184 0.35 2,996 1.19
Ireland 23,361 1.93 5,435 2.17
Italy 144,501 11.93 14,116 5.63
Luxembourg 2,008 0.17 99 0.04
Netherlands 40,919 3.38 9,299 3.71
Portugal 57,923 4.78 4,018 1.60
Spain 201,808 16.67 59,609 23.77
Sweden 30,625 2.53 11,030 4.40
UK 313,169 25.86 73,627 29.36
Total 1,210,831 100 250,814 100
Table 3. Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for our final sample of entrants. Variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Sizet+1 and Sizet+9 are measured in thousand euros, deflated by Eurostat CPI (base year 2005), and they are trimmed
above the 99th percentile.
Mean St.Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Obs.
FinLevt+1 0.414 0.380 0 0.370 0.800 205,618
TotLevt+1 0.763 0.249 0.665 0.854 0.947 200,314
Sizet+1 1,126.88 2,571.83 213.87 383.35 873.31 205,618
Sizet+9 1,560.23 3,054.18 235.66 563.33 1,441.34 134,429
Tangibilityt+1 0.258 0.302 0.026 0.121 0.400 196,764
Profitabilityt+1 0.090 0.184 0.005 0.050 0.137 153,571
AIRt+9 27.901 21.528 10.099 22.694 37.201 205,616
EATRt−1 31.491 3.228 29.026 30.705 34.404 205,618
Carryforwardt−1 10.645 4.417 5 10 15 205,618
Table 4. Distribution of leverage at entry
This table reports summary statistics for the distribution of FinLevt+1 and TotLevt+1. Leverage measures are defined
in Section 2.2.1 and are computed at the end of the first fiscal year after incorporation. We split the sample of entrants
by year of incorporation.
Mean St.Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Obs.
FinLevt+1
1998 0.413 0.376 0 0.375 0.791 38,166
1999 0.422 0.380 0 0.394 0.806 47,749
2000 0.404 0.381 0 0.344 0.794 57,584
2001 0.417 0.381 0 0.372 0.807 62,119
Total 0.414 0.380 0 0.370 0.800 205,618
TotLevt+1
1998 0.756 0.251 0.652 0.845 0.943 37,380
1999 0.761 0.250 0.662 0.853 0.945 46,615
2000 0.757 0.253 0.654 0.849 0.945 56,010
2001 0.775 0.241 0.684 0.864 0.952 60,309
Total 0.763 0.249 0.665 0.854 0.947 200,314
Table 5. Persistence of leverage over time
This table reports the number of firms and the fraction of companies that report a value of leverage below the sample
median up to nine years from incorporation. Leverage measures are defined in Section 2.2.1. We restrict the analysis
to the subset of firms that report information on Leverage ratios for all nine years after incorporation: 85,740 firms for
FinLev, and 84,969 firms for TotLev.
Years from FinLev TotLev
incorporation Firms % Firms %
1 42,869 100 42,494 100
2 36,497 85.1 35,796 84.2
3 34,058 79.5 33,380 78.6
4 32,349 75.5 31,639 74.5
5 30,960 72.2 30,348 71.4
6 29,796 69.5 29,405 69.2
7 28,963 67.6 28,553 67.2
8 28,416 66.3 27,927 65.7
9 27,978 65.3 27,390 64.5
Table 6. Leverage equation
This table reports results of the estimation of equation (1), discussed in Section 4.1. The dependent variable is
FinLevt+1. All variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In columns (i) and (ii) EATRt−1 enters linearly, while in
columns (iii) and (iv) EATRt−1 enters also squared (EATRt−1 − SQ). We compute and report two sets of marginal
effects for EATR: (a) using the fractional Probit estimates, as in Papke and Wooldrige, 1996; (b) using OLS estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at country-industry level.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dep. Variable: FinLevt+1
Sizet+1 0.120*** 0.057*** 0.119*** 0.055***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
EATRt−1 2.543** 2.313*** 30.140*** 26.852***
(1.02) (0.88) (9.51) (8.85)
EATRt−1 − SQ -4.169*** -3.716***
(1.45) (1.36)
Tangibilityt+1 0.636*** 0.633***
(0.21) (0.21)
Profitabilityt+1 -0.796*** -0.800***
(0.10) (0.09)
Constant -9.929*** -8.116*** -55.519*** -48.627***
(3.49) (2.94) (15.81) (14.55)
Observations 205,618 150,174 205,618 150,174
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Distribution of Marginal Effects for EATRt−1 - Fractional Probit
Mean 0.0302 0.0270 0.0178 0.0139
Std. Dev. 0.0039 0.0040 0.0123 0.0117
Q1 0.0279 0.0246 0.0070 0.0051
Median 0.0298 0.0264 0.0185 0.0093
Q3 0.0331 0.0300 0.0259 0.0211
(b) Marginal Effects for EATRt−1 - OLS Estimates
Mean 0.0319 0.0273 0.0197 0.0150
Table 7. Leverage equation: Total leverage measure
This table reports results of the estimation of equation (1), discussed in Section 4.1. The dependent variable is
TotLevt+1. All variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In columns (i) and (ii) EATRt−1 enters linearly, while
in columns (iii) and (iv) EATRt−1 enters also squared (EATRt−1 − SQ). Two sets of marginal effects for EATR
are computed: (a) using the fractional Probit estimates, as in Papke and Wooldrige, 1996); (b) using OLS estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at country-industry level.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dep. Variable: TotLevt+1
Sizet+1 -0.025* -0.068*** -0.025* -0.069***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
EATRt−1 2.787** 3.177** 15.554 15.081
(1.24) (1.24) (10.00) (9.47)
EATRt−1 − SQ -1.935 -1.807
(1.58) (1.48)
Tangibilityt+1 -0.152 -0.154
(0.17) (0.17)
Profitabilityt+1 -0.809*** -0.811***
(0.11) (0.11)
Constant -9.245** -9.449** -30.267* -29.056*
(4.29) (4.14) (15.99) (15.40)
Observations 200,314 147,552 200,314 147,552
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Distribution of Marginal Effects for EATRt−1 - Fractional Probit
Mean 0.0270 0.0293 0.0221 0.0241
Std. Dev. 0.0054 0.0068 0.0078 0.0087
Q1 0.0238 0.0249 0.0173 0.0189
Median 0.0266 0.0286 0.0207 0.0228
Q3 0.0298 0.0336 0.0260 0.0275
(b) Marginal Effects for EATRt−1 - OLS Estimates
Mean 0.0282 0.0320 0.0229 0.0264
Table 8. Augmented Leverage equation: Creditor Rights and Transparency
This table reports results of the estimation of equation (1), discussed in Section 4.1. The dependent variable is
FinLevt+1. All variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, except HIGH−CREDITOR−RIGHTS and HIGH−
TRANSPARENCY , which are defined in section 5.1.2. Countries with strong creditor rights are: Austria, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands and UK. Countries with high transparency are: Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Sweden and UK. Standard errors are clustered at country-industry level.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dep. Variable: FinLevt+1
Sizet+1 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EATRt−1 2.404*** 26.325*** -0.181 32.567**
(0.89) (8.89) (0.82) (14.86)
EATRt−1 − SQ -3.623*** -4.689**
(1.36) (2.16)
EATRt−1 ×HIGH − CREDITOR−RIGHTS 1.881* -12.356
(1.04) (17.80)
EATRt−1 − SQ×HIGH − CREDITOR−RIGHTS 2.065
(2.69)
EATRt−1 ×HIGH − TRANSPARENCY 2.903*** -37.916**
(0.70) (17.72)
EATRt−1 − SQ×HIGH − TRANSPARENCY 5.895**
(2.61)
Tangibilityt+1 0.632*** 0.629*** 0.634*** 0.636***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Profitabilityt+1 -0.793*** -0.798*** -0.808*** -0.809***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant -14.722*** -29.679 -9.485*** 4.015
(4.92) (26.87) (2.87) (20.67)
Observations 150,155 150,155 148,990 148,990
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Statistics 3.278 2.449 17.035 9.291
p-value [degrees of freedom] 0.07 [1] 0.29 [2] 0.00 [1] 0.01 [2]
Distribution of Marginal Effects for EATRt−1 - Fractional Probit
Low CREDITOR-RIGHTS - Low TRANSPARENCY
Mean 0.0279 0.0145 -0.0019 -0.0067
Std. Dev. 0.0042 0.0118 0.0002 0.0051
Q1 0.0256 0.0063 -0.0021 -0.0088
Median 0.0273 0.0094 -0.0020 -0.0073
Q3 0.0310 0.0216 -0.0019 -0.0048
High CREDITOR-RIGHTS - High TRANSPARENCY
Mean 0.0518 0.0411 0.0350 0.0354
Std. Dev. 0.0076 0.0076 0.0043 0.0036
Q1 0.0463 0.0360 0.0337 0.0347
Median 0.0542 0.0427 0.0354 0.0368
Q3 0.0578 0.0470 0.0367 0.0376
Table 9. Growth equation
This table reports estimation results for equation (2) in columns (i) to (iv), and for equations (2) and (3) in columns (v) and (vi). These
models are discussed in Section 4.2. The dependent variable is Sizet+9. All variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Standard errors
are clustered at country-industry level in columns (i)-(iv), and are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications in columns (v)-(vi).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Heckman Heckman
Dep. Variable: Sizet+9
FinLevt+1 -0.167*** -0.207*** -0.156*** -0.199*** -0.167*** -0.207***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Sizet+1 0.771*** 0.784*** 0.763*** 0.776*** 0.771*** 0.784***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Tangibilityt+1 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.094***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Profitabilityt+1 0.228*** 0.223*** 0.228***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
Constant 1.174*** 1.167*** 1.145*** 1.090*** 0.965** 1.166***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.44) (0.05)
Selection Equation
AIRt+9 -0.025*** -0.024***
(0.00) (0.00)
FinLevt+1 -0.010 -0.029***
(0.01) (0.01)
Sizet+1 -0.045*** -0.031***
(0.00) (0.00)
Tangibilityt+1 0.261***
(0.01)
Profitabilityt+1 0.510***
(0.02)
Constant 1.392*** -5.086***
(0.33) (0.11)
R2 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.42
Mills’ lambda 0.031 0.003
(0.05) (0.05)
ρ 0.03 0.00
Observations 134,429 96,363 134,429 96,363 205,616 150,174
Observations censored 71,189 53,811
Country FE No No No No Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes No No No No
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country-Year-Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No
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Table 11. Augmented Growth equation: The role of Initial size, Creditor rights, and
Transparency
This table shows estimation results for equation (2), discussed in Section 4.2. The dependent variable is Sizet+9. All variables are defined
in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, except HIGH −CREDITOR−RIGHTS and HIGH − TRANSPARENCY , which are defined in section 5.1.2.
Countries with strong creditor rights are: Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and UK. Countries with high transparency are:
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. Standard errors are clustered by country-industry.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Dep. Variable: Sizet+9
FinLevt+1 -1.908*** -1.754*** -2.115*** -1.779*** -2.540*** -2.031***
(0.52) (0.35) (0.43) (0.37) (0.52) (0.39)
FinLevt+1 − SQ 2.070** 1.627*** 2.216*** 1.651*** 2.666*** 1.894***
(0.81) (0.48) (0.70) (0.49) (0.80) (0.50)
Sizet+1 0.744*** 0.746*** 0.747*** 0.747*** 0.729*** 0.732***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FinLevt+1 × Sizet+1 0.403*** 0.340*** 0.399*** 0.338*** 0.450*** 0.364***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
FinLevt+1 − SQ× Sizet+1 -0.464*** -0.359*** -0.458*** -0.360*** -0.511*** -0.384***
(0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08)
FinLevt+1 ×HIGH − CREDITOR−RIGHTS 0.688*** 0.423***
(0.14) (0.15)
FinLevt+1 − SQ×HIGH − CREDITOR−RIGHTS -0.570*** -0.252
(0.14) (0.18)
Sizet+1 ×HIGH − CREDITOR−RIGHTS -0.017 -0.004
(0.04) (0.05)
FinLevt+1 ×HIGH − TRANSPARENCY 0.618*** 0.344**
(0.16) (0.14)
FinLevt+1 − SQ×HIGH − TRANSPARENCY -0.566*** -0.300**
(0.15) (0.14)
Sizet+1 ×HIGH − TRANSPARENCY 0.014 0.029
(0.04) (0.04)
Tangibilityt+1 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.084***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Profitabilityt+1 0.195*** 0.198*** 0.207***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 1.230*** 1.250*** 1.267*** 1.174*** 1.215*** 1.113***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.19) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15)
R2 0.35 0.42 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.42
Observations 134,429 96,363 134,398 96,354 132,393 96,264
Country-Year-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix: Additional empirical results
Amadeus Database Balance Sheet Structure
Amadeus format for balance sheet liabilities items is the following:
1. Total Shareholders Funds: Total equity (Capital + Other shareholders funds)
2. Non Current Liabilities: Long term liabilities of the company, whose sub-items are:
• Long Term Debt: Long term financial debts (e.g. to credit institutions, loans and credits,
bonds)
• Other Non Current Liabilities: Other long term liabilities (trade debts, group companies,
pension loans, etc.)
3. Current Liabilities: Current liabilities of the company, whose sub-items are:
• Loans: Short term financial debts (e.g. to credit institutions + part of Long term
financial debts payable within the year, bonds, etc.)
• Creditors: Debts to suppliers and contractors (trade creditors)
• Other Current Liabilities: Other current liabilities such as pension, personnel costs,
taxes, intra-group debts, accounts received in advance, etc.
Table A1. Augmented Leverage equation: Loss Carryforward
This table reports results of the estimation of equation (1), discussed in Section 4.1. The dependent variable
is +1. All variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In columns (i) and (ii) −1 enters
linearly, while in columns (iii) and (iv) −1 enters also squared (−−1). Two sets of marginal
effects for  are computed: (a) using the fractional probit estimates (as in Papke and Wooldrige, 1996);
(b) using OLS estimates. Standard errors are clustered at country-industry level.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dep. Variable: +1
+1 0.119*** 0.056*** 0.118*** 0.055***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
−1 1.299*** 1.222** 29.573*** 27.532***
(0.48) (0.60) (8.01) (7.12)
− −1 -4.181*** -3.910***
(1.17) (1.05)
−1 -0.098 -0.172** 0.008 -0.073
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
+1 0.637*** 0.634***
(0.21) (0.21)
+1 -0.793*** -0.798***
(0.09) (0.09)
Constant -5.412*** -4.997*** -53.474*** -49.509***
(1.52) (1.90) (13.80) (12.22)
Observations 205,618. 150,174 205,618 150,174
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distribution of Marginal Effects for −1 - Fractional Probit
Mean 0.0155 0.0143 0.0101 0.0062
Std. Dev. 0.0020 0.0021 0.0116 0.0114
Q1 0.0143 0.0130 -0.0001 -0.0024
Median 0.0152 0.0139 0.0108 0.0019
Q3 0.0169 0.0159 0.0177 0.0134
Average Marginal Effects for −1 - OLS Estimates
Mean 0.0163 0.0145 0.0109 0.0067
Table A2. Augmented Leverage equation: North and Core dummy variables
This table reports results of the estimation of equation (1), discussed in Section 4.1. The dependent variable
is +1. All variables are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In columns (i) and (iii) −1 enters
linearly, while in columns (ii) and (iv) −1 enters also squared ( − −1). Countries in the
North are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Nether- lands, Sweden,
and UK. Countries in the core are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and UK. Standard errors are clustered at country-industry level.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dep. Variable: +1
+1 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.055***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
−1 2.372*** 15.841 2.766*** 20.781
(0.86) (14.72) (0.87) (13.42)
− −1 -2.054 -2.853
(2.27) (2.04)
−−1 -0.152 12.934
(0.96) (17.14)
− −−1 -1.935
(2.58)
− −1 -0.597 17.319
(0.86) (18.23)
− − −1 -2.482
(2.74)
+1 0.637*** 0.635*** 0.636*** 0.635***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
+1 -0.796*** -0.801*** -0.797*** -0.801***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Constant -7.803** -51.995*** -7.633** -68.129***
(3.92) (16.50) (3.24) (21.13)
N.obs 150,174 150,174 150,174 150,174
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Statistics 0.025 0.573 0.479 1.598
P-value [degrees of freedom] 0.87 [1] 0.75 [2] 0.49 [1] 0.45 [2]
